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1 Introduction
Deconstructive Evaluation of Risk In Dependability Arguments and Safety Cases
(DERIDASC) is a study focussed on the language used by safety engineers in their
intellectual discourse. The DERIDASC project is inter-disciplinary in the sense
that it experiments with techniques from philosophy, literary theory (Eagleton
1996, Culler 1997) and semiotics (Barthes 1994, Cobley 2001, Culler 2001) to
diagnose problems of language, definition, and interpretation in safety
engineering. The project aims to make safety engineers re-think and improve some
of their habitual definitions. The project adopts methods of textual analysis usually
found only in studies of the arts and literature, although the kinds of textual studies
we propose have also been influential in the discipline of law (Ward 1998, Chapter
7).
In particular, the project is applying the ideas of “deconstruction” to safety texts.
Deconstruction is a term coined by philosopher Jacques Derrida (see Abrams 1999
for a short summary) and denotes the analysis of a text to reveal hidden meanings,
especially those which contradict the surface message. The critical reader reads a
text “against the grain”, concentrating less on what the author is trying to say than
on issues such as what the text tries to avoid saying (e.g. the playing down of facts
that might undermine what is argued) and on what is asserted rhetorically without
evidence. The idea of deconstruction is to challenge the unconscious
presuppositions inherited from conceptual frameworks for thinking.
Deconstruction, it can be argued, facilitates the evaluation of the text and its
language as ‘technologies’ for thinking (Clark 2000). We hypothesize that
Derrida’s deconstruction, with its emphasis on revealing suppressed contradictions
and paradoxes in texts, may help illuminate some of the difficulties of safety
argumentation and might be a basis for new analysis techniques.
In Section 2 of the paper we offer a brief overview of the problems of textual
analysis as they are represented in Derrida’s work and in deconstructive literary
criticism in general. Our emphasis is on how the necessarily limited scope of a text
renders it incomplete entailing risks of circular justification and self-contradiction.
Section 3 explains ‘deconstruction’ as a procedure (although a ‘deconstruction’
should avoid reduction to a systematic ‘procedure’) for the analysis of binary
distinctions. It presents an example deconstruction of the distinction between
likelihood and severity that is commonly assumed in standard definitions of risk
(see van der Meulen 2000, p. 245 for a list of examples). In Section 4, we discuss
why some of the issues raised by deconstruction are necessarily of concern in
safety engineering, and indeed are already having their effects.
2 The Problem of the Text
A text is a sequential structure requiring a starting point and a conclusion. It is
essentially narrative in form. Thus we require a starting point for our explanation
of deconstruction. We start with a discussion of some familiar problems of
authorship; but by the very act, we have already run the risk of misrepresentation.
This problem of choosing a starting point for a text, of laying out the basic
assumptions of an argument, or of conceiving the axioms and definitions of a
formal system, are key concerns of Derrida’s deconstruction.
Most authors have experienced uncertainty about how to begin a text. A well-
known cliché that purports to explain the usual structure (introduction-body-
conclusion) is that it should “tell the reader what you’re going to tell them, tell
them, then tell them what you’ve told them”. It seems to indicate that one should
begin with the desired conclusion; but if this advice were to be followed rigorously
a text would contain three attempts at assertion and no argument (even then,
according to deconstructive thought, each attempt to repeat ‘the same’ meaning
would be doomed to failure).
To be accepted as an argument as opposed to a series of rhetorical assertions a text
needs starting points that appear in some way more basic than its conclusions. The
choice of these starting points is absolutely necessary (no text could recount
everything) but it imposes bounds on what can be said in the text. Thus each genre
of text (a technical manual, an essay, a novel, a poem) depends upon a reader’s
acceptance of conventional assumptions about ‘relevance’ for that genre, and
additionally, any particular restrictions requested by the author of the text at hand.
There is a tacit agreement that certain subjects are to be considered ‘irrelevant’ to
that genre of discourse, and will not be raised in it. This is an entirely necessary
procedure, but unfortunately it is hard to argue that ‘relevance’ defines anything
other than a socially-constructed boundary which the reality of events need not
respect.
The ‘starting point’ (Derrida’s term is ‘origin’) for any text or argument cannot be
absolutely justified, since one knows that reality exceeds the bound it constitutes:
before the argument begins, everything else has already ‘begun’ (Bennington &
Derrida 1993). So when we consider what could determine a choice of origin(s)
(of basic assumptions, or of founding axioms and definitions) it becomes apparent
that the most attractive criterion is that they allow the desired conclusion to be
reached by some means. Thus we encounter the problem of ‘constructivism’.
Origins of all kinds can be challenged on the basis that they are constructed in
order to guarantee and preserve a desired conclusion, giving it the appearance of
something that has been ‘justified’; indeed, the basic assumptions may even be
‘reverse engineered’ from the desired conclusion.
Although it is possible for an author to start with some unusual or important
observation and work through its possible consequences with no clear end in view,
this is unlikely to lead to a highly structured and disciplined text (although literary
authors have experimented with the approach). Nonetheless, most texts are
constructed so as to mimic this process and in a successful text the conclusions
will appear to follow naturally and obviously from the assumptions. However, this
structure rarely corresponds to the process by which the text was really constructed
especially when the writing of the text demands at least some idea of the desired
conclusion. Even a text that sets out to answer a question in as unbiased a fashion
as possible will tend to presuppose a fixed set of expected (or already extant)
answers. Indeed, to ask a question in a text is already to have made a proposition
regarding the significance of the question and the possibility of an answer.
One might object that in rational argument, which proceeds according to the laws
of logic and of grammar, the process by which the text has been constructed does
not matter. So long as the conclusions follow from the assumptions according to
the laws and so long as the assumptions are accepted, the conclusion must be
accepted.  However, this is also true of a tautology, which raises the issue of how
to distinguish tautological argumentation from ‘meaningful’ argumentation. For
example, logicians have long realised that formal argumentation and proof cannot
eliminate the possibility of circular reasoning. This is partly because no logic can
prove that its own axioms and definitions are indubitable truths; but it is also
because circular reasoning is not a problem of logic but a problem of belief
(Cambridge 1999, p. 144).
We often accept a set of assumptions in a provisional sense ‘for the purposes of
argument’, in order to initiate communication, or just to get through the task of
reading a text; but why should we ever be more committal and accept assumptions
as true thereby accepting the conclusion? Ironically, one possible reason for
accepting assumptions is that the conclusion that follows from them is already
believed, or at least strongly desired. Thus even the most rigorous argument cannot
eliminate the risk that its assumptions have become ‘detached from’ the reality
they are supposed to describe. Biases, perceptual limitations, and the desires of the
arguer are important factors; but the necessity of structuring reality into a tractable
mental model is the real culprit. Indeed, deconstructive thinkers argue that the very
nature of the ‘signs’ we use to represent reality and their irreducible role in
perception and thinking ensure that abstract arguments can never be
unproblematically ‘attached to’ reality.
Deconstruction sees the relation between language and reality as a problem of
‘effects of meaning’ rather than one of logic. Questioning the meaning of
assumptions is of course essential to any assessment of their validity. However, in
Limited Inc Derrida shows that any attempt at an objective assessment of
‘meaning’ is bound to encounter highly inconvenient obstacles (Derrida 1977).
When we consider ‘effects of meaning’ we find that they are inherently
unpredictable. They are partly determined by socially accepted rules for
communication, and partly determined by the individual intentions of the
communicators; but they also depend upon what is rather vaguely referred to as
‘context’. To complete the definition of a meaning effect, we would need to
capture ‘context’ in a description; but context appears to have no definite bound;
and furthermore, its description merely produces more ‘text’ which requires
context to explain it in turn. One can try to arrest the indeterminacy of context by
appeals to “what a speaker (author) must have meant at the time”; but this is
another disguised appeal to context. It is complicated, for example, by the question
of how unconscious mind relates to conscious intentions, and whether speakers
(authors) really had clear intentions in the context of utterance (writing). Because
of the apparent necessity and simultaneous impossibility of an objective definition
of a context, nothing is more than provisionally sufficient to bound the effects of
meaning that a particular text can have; these are, after all, a function of the future
contexts in which the text will be repeated (read). There is therefore no ‘final
interpretation’ of any text, even the most simple of sentences. At best we can
expect meanings to be socially constructed and agreed; but this is hardly an
objective foundation for rational thought.
It is common to represent the problems of natural language meaning in terms of
‘ambiguity’. Derrida (1981) argues that this actually underestimates the extent of
the difficulty, since it presupposes that a text has a fixed set of meanings that can
be identified in principle, even if no objective choice can be made between them;
but reading a text is always ‘productive’. Because context itself is unpredictable
and because we are condemned to shift through time, any text retains the potential
for effects of meaning that cannot be foreseen. Each time we re-read a text we may
notice (produce?) something new. As Derrida puts it, “iterability  alters” (Derrida
1977, p.62); and it does so because previous contexts can never be perfectly
described and are never exactly reproduced.
Wheeler (2000) summarises Derrida’s thought as a working out of the
consequences of there being no ‘magic language’. A ‘magic language’ would be
one to which all other languages could refer for their ‘literal meaning’. Usually, we
think of ‘thought’ or ‘perception’ as the things to which our utterances refer; but
Derrida argues that these too involve the manipulation of signs, and are therefore
linguistic, with all the interpretive insecurities and indeterminacies that natural
language exhibits.
The problematic nature of the idea of a ‘magic language’ and of the opposition
between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ meaning may not be immediately apparent; but it
suffices to consider whether the ‘literal meaning’ of a statement could ever be
written down non-figuratively in some language. If such a language existed we
would be well advised to discard all others. Its meaning would never be in doubt,
and it would provide an absolutely secure basis for thought and expression. All of
poetry with its complex metaphors would be expressible ‘literally’ in it. The very
fact that we can translate texts from one language to another seems to suggest that
there is indeed some ‘literal’ meaning being transferred; but Derrida counters that
the process of translation is always somewhat imperfect with respect to the source
text and creates new meaning effects in the target text.
Since the late 1960’s, Derrida has published around twenty major works arguing
that philosophy has persistently resisted close consideration of the
unpredictabilities of writing, of representation, and of interpretation because of the
disconcerting implications for thought, rationality, and logic. If meaning effects
are essentially unpredictable, we cannot be sure that we are thinking ‘rationally’ at
all. He argues that the idea that meaning can be mastered, described, and bounded
is an unreasoning prejudice which Western modes of thought secretly depend
upon. He terms this prejudice ‘logocentricity’. For Derrida, since a text is
‘founded’ insecurely on its meaning effects it is a rather perilous structure,
condemned to conceal knowledge of its internal contradictions whilst also being
condemned to reveal them to readers who will not play the author’s game. Since it
is in the nature of any ‘sign’ to be arbitrary with respect to its referent, there is
only a conventional, not a natural, attachment between them. So when considered
as a network of cross-referring signs, a text always has the potential to mean
something other than what the author intended and perhaps even to contain a
denial of what the author was trying to say.
Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of the dilemmas of the text can be loosely
compared to Godel’s discoveries about incompleteness in formal logic. A text can
attain an appearance of consistency only by self-imposed bounds on its
completeness; as the text attempts a more complete treatment of its subject,
internal inconsistency, loss of structure, and lack of conclusiveness (Derrida uses
the term ‘closure’) become more apparent.  A deconstructive reading concentrates
on the way that terminology and criteria of relevance are ‘constructed’ in order to
try and prevent a loss of control over meaning, whilst maintaining the appearance
of an ordered progression from assumptions to conclusions. Thus instead of
refuting the arguments in a text, a deconstruction concentrates on revealing the
limits of authorial control. The challenge is that an apparently coherent, logical,
and structured text achieves its ordered appearance not by representing truths, but
by suppressing anything that contradicts or undermines its intended message or
else renders that message trivial in its own terms. Deconstructive readings often
seize upon issues mentioned only in passing in a text and attempt to show that
when the implications of these issues are followed through rigorously they
contradict the main line of argument.
The alleged inevitability of this kind of internal collapse derives from the fact that
a text needs starting points - ‘origins’. Deconstructive thinkers argue that since a
starting point is a necessary imperfection, it is inevitable that in the course of
thinking and writing ideas that cannot be properly accounted for in terms of the
argument will crop up. How can a text deal with such ideas? It might resort to a
kind of ‘myth of The Fall’ in which the valued origin is somehow tainted from
without; it may fall silent at what appears to be a crucial point; it may try to evade
the difficulty by subtle appeals to the readers background knowledge, culture, or
charity; or it may resort to blatant rhetoric in order to divert attention from
inconvenient facts, contrary views, or deep uncertainties; misrepresentation or
caricature might be used in order to weaken the force of a contrary idea or opinion.
Rhetoric is commonly used to assert that certain issues are irrelevant to an
argument, which raises the question of how they came to be raised there in the first
place.
All these phenomena are indicative of problems with the orderly progression of
argument in the text. Indeed, the argument may not be ‘progressing’ at all; perhaps
the desired conclusion is merely trying to re-assert itself in different terms, and
since “iterability alters’, inevitably failing to do so.
More positively, Derrida is interested in how, at times when argumentation and
terminology falter, valuable progress can be made by a resort to analogy and
metaphor. In rational discourse the status of figurative language is problematic;
metaphor is regarded as an unsatisfactory detour on the way to truth; but
deconstructive thinkers are generally positive about figurative language, and adopt
Nietschze’s dictum that ‘truths’ are merely metaphors whose status as such we
have forgotten out of habit (for a discussion see Gayatri Spivak’s introduction to
Derrida’s Of Grammatology – Derrida 1967). Another a-logical but quite
productive strategy is the introduction of a neologism. Neologisms usually have
recognisable roots in familiar words; indeed an author may reuse a familiar word
without alteration, thus extending its meaning into new contexts. Derrida calls the
study of this process ‘paleonymics’. These processes produce new meaning effects
whilst drawing on the power of existing words. Such strategies are not risk free.
Neither are they obviously justifiable by any criteria except practical necessity.
Yet without them argumentation would be exceedingly difficult, and perhaps even
sterile or impossible.
3 Deconstructing Risk
The usual starting point for a deconstructive reading is the analysis of the binary
distinctions that a text depends upon. Deconstructive thinkers claim that each term
of a binary opposition will ‘contaminate’ the other. This view arises from a theory
of language according to which the meaning of a term is determined by its position
within the linguistic system, and not by any fixed property of ‘meaning’ that is
indissociably bound to it. A ‘meaning’ is an effect produced by the inter-
relationships among the terms of a language. Consequently, neither concept in an
opposition of contrast has an identity that is entirely independent of its ‘opposite’.
For example, if we take one of the terms of an opposition and try to define it, we
find that we can only do so by mentioning the other term, and vice versa. Each
term contains what Derrida calls the “trace” of its opposite: so in deconstructive
thinking, concepts are impure, or to put it another way, distinctions can always be
undone by abstracting something that is common to both of them. Derrida claims
that the usual result is an explosion of complexity of discriminations, rather than
mere vagueness (Derrida 1977).
As an example we will examine the distinction between the l ikelihood
(probability) of an accident and the severity of an accident. These two terms are
broadly accepted as independent variables which combine to make up what we call
‘risk’(van der Meulen 2000, p. 245). It might not be thought that either of these
terms could be seen as more ‘original’ or ‘valuable’ than the other. Yet experts in
probability theory tend to argue that however severe the consequences associated
with a risk, if the probability can be made so small that the overall product (the
total ‘risk’) is insignificant, then risk acceptance will be rational. Those who
distrust probability theory argue that probability models are prone to give us the
answers that we would prefer to hear, so that the severity of the possible
consequences should be the primary criteria in risk acceptance. We can see this
debate in terms of a disagreement about which component of risk should be of
prime importance, even though the definition of risk as their ‘product’ seems to
suggest that neither is primary.
The next deconstructive question will be to consider how severity and probability
could be interdependent. They are presented as independent variables, but a close
questioning of this assumption quickly complicates it. A measured probability of
an accident, against which any estimate of likelihood is ultimately assessed, cannot
be determined until the system lifetime has passed. However, this ‘objective’
measure can itself be determined by the severity of accidents. For example,
suppose that an airliner crashes on its first passenger flight. Consider two possible
futures: a) political pressure keeps the aircraft flying and it goes on to build up an
enormous number of accident-free flight hours; b) the crash is used as a reason for
cancelling the aircraft programme. The different lifetimes make the “objective”
probability of an accident per flight hour very different in each case; but the
aircraft lifetime is dependent upon the political will to either keep flying the
aircraft or withdraw it. Concorde provides an example of this. A recent crash
transformed Concorde from one of the safest aeroplanes in terms of accidents-per-
flying-hour into one of the most dangerous (Daily Telegraph 2000); but the
political will existed to keep Concorde flying. If it had not, Concorde would have
remained a statistically ‘dangerous’ aircraft. It is possible that Concorde will go on
in future to build up further flight hours without incident, thus apparently
‘becoming safer’. The idea that a measured probability is ‘objective’ is
undermined when we realise that the size of the sample space from which the
measurements were taken is determined by something that is not an objective
given. As far as statistical measures of accidents-per-unit-time are concerned, the
size of the sample space is determined by willingness to carry on living with the
severity of any actual consequences. Thus, not only are probability estimates
dependent upon severity estimates - in the sense that we may unconsciously
underestimate the probability of events we fear – but even the measured
probability of an accident-per-unit-time is dependent upon its severity should at
least one accident actually occur.
Further analysis also produces the explosion of complexity of meaning predicted
by Derrida. We have argued that what one might think of as “objective” measures
of risk likelihood depend upon subjective willingness to live with risk severity.
However, we must further ask what determines our willingness (or unwillingness)
to live with the possibility of severe consequences and why we might continue an
activity even after it has already had severe consequences. Evidently, this question
leads us to a consideration of enormously complex (even imponderable) issues of
choice. For example, often in the aftermath of an accident we are led to reiterate
the original question of risk acceptance. This may happen even where the accident
falls within the expected probability of occurrence. If, after a (re)consideration of
the likelihood of recurrence and the severity of the consequences, we make
changes to the system to reduce future risk, we cannot avoid the challenge that we
have retrospectively invalidated the original risk acceptance argument and that any
new argument  will be just as fragile as the first one. The rather-too-neat
distinction between likelihood and severity perhaps (mis)represents risk as a
simpler, more empirically verifiable, and more manageable concept than it really
is. Yet it seems impossible to do without this distinction. Indeed, the
‘deconstructive argument’ given above itself depends upon it. Culler (1998, p.149)
captures this paradox in an amusing way, noting that deconstruction can be
described as “sawing off the branch upon which one is sitting”.
4 Relevance To Safety Engineering
Derrida denies that deconstruction can be reduced to a corrective procedure or
method, preferring to define the unravelling of conventional meanings merely as
“what happens”. Therefore, we do not propose the deconstructive analysis of texts
as a replacement for the more usual procedure of analysing safety arguments for
flaws in the reasoning, inaccurate data, and gaps in the evidence; but neither do we
consider them as necessarily ‘secondary’ in relation to such tasks. Were we to do
so, we would fall prey to a form of contradictory logic that Derrida (1967) calls
‘the logic of the supplement’; for example, if we state that the textual analyses we
propose are mere ‘supplements’ to current procedures, then we imply that they are
both necessary and unnecessary to current procedures. Anything that can be
‘supplemented’ must by definition have a basic deficiency or lack that the
supplement can remedy; there is therefore no reason to consider it as ‘primary’ or
self-sufficient in the absence of its supplement. Deconstruction must already be
going on in safety engineering, but not under that name. In this section we argue
that this is indeed so.
The problems of pinning-down intended meaning, of finding implicit assumptions
and circularities, and identifying what is a-logical, or even incoherent in a text are
of interest to anyone involved in assessing safety texts. The text, with all its risks,
is a technology that safety engineering seems unable to do without. Indeed, we are
not the first safety experts to take an interest in deconstruction. For example,
Turner (1994) discusses Derrida’s ideas about the relation between chance and
necessity, and how it relates to the interpretation of accidents. On DERIDASC we
have turned to the textual representation of rational argument and rational choice
in the process of safety acceptance.
For texts that present safety arguments the conclusion in view is specified in
advance and necessarily so: naturally, the purpose of a safety argument is to arrive
at the conclusion that a system is adequately safe. Once the argument has been
constructed (usually by the supplier of a system) so as to reach this pre-specified
conclusion, it is analysed for flaws according to whatever regulatory or assessment
criteria happen to be in place in the application domain. The rules of this exchange
seem simple enough then: an argument is constructed; it is put forward as valid;
then it is tested to ‘destruction’ in the sense that flaws of logic, gaps in evidence,
and inaccurate assertions are identified. If no flaws are found, the argument has
survived its tests and the system in question will be provisionally accepted for use.
However, most safety experts will recognise this description as extremely
idealised. It does not recognise phenomena such as: ambiguities in the
interpretation of evidence; professional disagreements about what constitutes ‘best
practice’; collectively recognised limitations (of knowledge, of technology, of the
intractability of certain problems). Neither does it recognise the political, legal, or
moral issues involved in safety acceptance; nor changes in public opinion about
risk acceptability; nor indeed the question of how (or whether) public opinion is to
be elicited in the first place. When so many different forces can be brought to bear
on a particular risk decision it seems unlikely that an argument solely based on
rational calculation will be sufficient to determine the decision, especially if, as
deconstruction implies, the ‘meaning effects’ of the calculation (as opposed to its
more tractable mathematical meaning) will be at the very least problematic.
The challenge that apparently ‘objective’ models of risk decision-making are
really post-hoc rationalisations of asserted biases is not unprecedented in safety
engineering.  For example, Adams (1995, Chapter 6) argues that since there is no
objectively meaningful notion of ‘value’ upon which to found the monetisation of
risk, the results of Cost-Benefit Analysis are determined by the biases of whoever
is conducting the analysis. In his words: “cost-benefit analysis is almost always
used not to make decisions, but to justify decisions that have already been made”.
Similar arguments have been made concerning the use of reliability theory in
safety assessment. On this subject, Leveson (1995, p. 168) quotes DT Lowe: “Risk
analysis of the type considered here is to safety what the merry-go-round is to
transport. We can spend a lot of time and money on it, only to go round and round
in circles without really getting anywhere.”
Furthermore, problems of constructivism in interpretation often emerge in the
context of discussions about Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Crawford (2001)
reviews objections to PRA ranging from the subtle to the unsubtle (quoting
physicist Richard Feynman as saying “If a guy tells me the probability of failure is
1 in 105, I know he’s full of crap.”). A rejoinder to Crawford’s paper provides an
amusing example of how different representations of a problem can lead to mutual
incomprehension, circular self-justification, and unconscious self-contradiction.
Vesely and Fragola (2002) object to Crawford’s questioning of the meaningfulness
of statistical testing with the words: “The author’s conclusions may be interesting
conjectures, but they have no statistical basis.” This misses Crawford’s point
entirely, especially as Vesely and Fragola agree that: “No PRA should be taken at
face value” (our italics).
The phenomenon of circular justification also troubles discussions about risk
‘tolerability’ (Health & Safety Commission 1998). Our oft-discussed principle is
that risks must be reduced to a level that is “as low as reasonably practicable”
(ALARP). However, ALARP is based on the assumption that for a particular type
of safety system a “tolerable region” actually exists; this guarantees that at least
some level of effort will enable it to be attained, but this presupposition is never
questioned. The notion of ‘tolerability’ implies that what is tolerated is
undesirable, but in some sense unavoidable; but if risk taking were entirely
unavoidable it would not require ‘justification’.
We can observe analogous difficulties in discussions about the use of Commercial
Off-The-Shelf software in critical applications, particularly where the software in
question was not originally developed for critical use. A text that presupposes the
possibility of the safety-critical use of COTS and uses this presupposition as the
starting point for its arguments will find it impossible to account for phenomena
that indicate why COTS use was previously discounted in safety critical systems.
For example, one text we have analysed proposes a method for justifying the use
of “Software of Unknown Pedigree” (SOUP) in safety-related systems. It alludes
briefly to the possibility that ‘Easter Eggs’ might be buried in COTS software, and
comments that “such problems are harder to deal with than in bespoke software
…”; but the text seems unwilling to go much further. An alert reader might wonder
how a software engineering manager should “deal with” Easter Egg software.
Obviously, identification of the offending source code is the first pre-requisite.
Subsequently, removal will be desirable. However, this could prove tricky if there
are non-functional dependencies between the Easter Egg software and the useful
software. It may be that (e.g. due to memory mapping sensitivities) the Easter Egg
software cannot be removed; but it could perhaps be rendered harmless by a
suitable “wrapper” function.
What of the development process that allows Easter Egg software to get through
compilation and build into a shipped delivery? Evidently, the programmers
responsible need to be identified and sanctioned. The development process needs
to be re-examined and modified to make sure the childish trick will be detected if
it is played again. Hence, there is no way to “deal with” a development process
that does not permit the identification of individual programmers and is not
amenable to the necessary preventative measures. The text avoids detailed
consideration of the Easter Egg issue, but when the issue is followed up, it quickly
leads to general principles that were well-accepted before the critical use of SOUP
was ever proposed: e.g. that the software source code should be available for
inspection; that object code and memory maps should be available just in case; that
the software should be open to reconfiguration and recompilation; and that a
software development process needs to be traceable and self improving. These
principles indicate why, until quite recently, the reuse of SOUP in critical systems
was not countenanced.  A text that does countenance it can have its ‘starting point’
‘deconstructed’ via the construction of some ‘earlier’ starting point.
Note that no text can evade this manoeuvre. The text in question gives various
hints that the authors were fully aware of the objections to SOUP discussed above
at the time of writing; for example, they have included warnings about Easter Egg
software in their appendices. However, given the logic of their text and its starting
point, they could not make them explicit in the main body. Deconstruction predicts
that the author is always to some extent a prisoner of the requirements of their text;
the arguments in a text (and this paper can be no exception) are unavoidably
shaped by the starting points that have been chosen or specified in advance.
5 Conclusion
A deconstructive reading will be very alert to a text’s unwillingness to follow up
the implications of avowedly peripheral issues that it does not avoid mention of.
There is no reason why safety arguments should not be confronted with the same
challenge, particularly as the risks of incompleteness, of ‘confirmation bias’, and
the necessity for creative ‘safety imagination’ when identifying hazards are
already recognised by safety engineers.  At the same time there is increasing
recognition of the irreducible subjectivity involved in safety judgements and
concern over whether ‘expert opinion’ is enough to cover gaps in meaningful data
(Redmill 2002a), (Redmill 2002b), (Adams 1995). Indeed, the controversy that
opened up during the drafting of the Royal Society Study Group report on Risk
Analysis, Perception, and Management (Royal Society 1992) has not receded.
Those who think risk management can be given a rational and scientific basis, and
those who doubt that it can, seem unable to find arguments that can convince those
predisposed to the other view (Hood & Jones 1999).
The deconstructive perspective would view this debate as an inescapable ‘social
text’. Deconstructive thought predicts that safety engineers will be unable to define
any objectively meaningful unit of risk - since meaning is a relational property,
there is no ‘objectively meaningful’ term in any case. Neither will there be any
unarguable criteria for determining risk ‘tolerability’. Yet we cannot abandon this
impossible search without relinquishing our discourse to a self-destructive and
indeed contradictory relativism. Rational safety argumentation requires basic
definitions, but by that very fact remains perpetually vulnerable to a charge of
presupposing a conceptual foundation that - if we recognise the challenge of
deconstruction - it cannot possibly have. Foundational concepts - for example, the
usually unquestioned likelihood-severity distinction - must be artificially
constructed; we cannot base them on the ‘discovery’ of some truth that lies beyond
all problems of interpretation.
Deconstruction can be viewed provisionally as a philosophical framework for
‘reading between the lines’. It stimulates the readers’ imagination by encouraging
a close questioning of basic terminology and its effects upon conceptual thinking
in what are, after all, rather dry technical documents. Most of the flaws sought out
in deconstructive readings are not qualitatively different from those targeted in
critical reading generally: e.g. ambiguities, logical fallacies, and gaps in reasoning.
Thus deconstructive reading could be used by assessors to analyse safety
arguments and used by systems developers in order to test and improve their safety
arguments before assessment. However, our examples will have alerted the reader
to the fact that deconstructive reading can undermine even the most logically
‘watertight’ argument by pointing out the limits of the language used to express it.
A major question for us is whether such fundamental questioning leads to
intellectual paralysis (in what is after all a decision-making process) or whether the
insights gained will be intellectually stimulating. Arguably, the point of
intellectual paralysis marks where safety ‘decision-making’ really begins (afresh?).
Acknowledgments: This work was supported under EPSRC research project
GR/R65527/01. The authors would like to thank Bob Malcolm for introducing us
to the work of Barry Turner on deconstruction and safety engineering.
6 References
Abrams MH 1999. A Glossary Of Literary Terms, Seventh Edition, Harcourt
Brace College Publishers, ISBN 0-15-505452-X.
Adams J 1995. Risk. Routledge, ISBN 1-85728-068-7.
Barthes R 1994. The Semiotic Challenge. Translated from the French edition
L’aventure Sémiologique (Editions de Seuil, 1985) by Richard Howard, University
of California Press, ISBN 0-520-08784-4.
Bennington G & Derrida J 1993. Jacques Derrida, University of Chicago Press,
ISBN 0-226-04262-6.
Cambridge 1999. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition,
Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-63722-8.
Clark T 2000. Deconstruction and Technology. In: Royle 2000, pp. 238-257.
Cobley P 2001. The Routledge Companion to Semiotics. Edited by Paul Cobley,
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, ISBN 0-415-243149.
Crawford J 2001. What’s Wrong with the Numbers? A Questioning Look at
Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Journal of System Safety, Vol. 37, No. 3, Third
Quarter 2001.
Culler J 1997. Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University
Press, ISBN: 0-19-285383.
Culler J 1998. On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism.
Routledge, ISBN 0-415-04555-X.
Culler J 2001. The Pursuit of Signs. Routledge Classics, Routledge, ISBN 0-4152-
5382-9.
Daily Telegraph 2000. So Just How Safe Is It To Travel by Plane? Article by Matt
Ridley, Wednesday, July 26th 2000. Also available at:
http://www.smh.com.au/news/specials/intl/concorde/conair21.html
Derrida J 1967. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The
John Hopkins University Press, Corrected Edition 1997, ISBN 0-8018-5830-5.
Derrida J 1977. Limited Inc. Edited by Gerald Graff, Northwestern University
Press, Evanston IL, ISBN 0-8101-0788-0.
Derrida J 1981. Dissemination . Translated from the French edition L a
Dissémination  (Editions de Seuil, 1972) by Barbara Johnson, Athlone
Contemporary European Thinkers, ISBN 0-485-12093-3.
Eagleton T 1996. Literary Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition, Blackwell
Publishers, ISBN 0-631-20188-2.
Health & Safety Commission1998. The Use of Computers In Safety-critical
Applications: Final Report of the Study Group on the Safety of Operational
Computer Systems. HSE Books, ISBN 0-7176-1620.
Hood C & Jones DKC 1999. Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk
Management, Routledge, ISBN 1-85728-598-0.
Leveson NG 1995. Safeware: System Safety and Computers. Addison Wesley,
ISBN0-201-11972-2.
Redmill F 2002a. Risk Analysis – A Subjective Process. In: The Engineering
Management Journal, IEE Publications, April 2002, pp. 91 – 96.
Redmill F 2002b. Exploring Subjectivity in Hazard Analysis. In: The Engineering
Management Journal, IEE Publications, June 2002, pp. 139 – 144.
Royal Society 1992. Risk Analysis, Perception, & Management, Report of a Royal
Society Study Group, The Royal Society, London ISBN 0-85403-467-6.
Royle N 2000. Deconstructions: A User’s Guide. Edited by Nicholas Royle,
Palgrave, ISBN 0-333-71761-9.
Turner  BA 1994. Software and Contingency: The Text and Vocabulary of System
Failure? Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 2 No. 1, March
1994.
van der Meulen M 2000. Definitions for Hardware and Software Safety Engineers.
Springer, ISBN 1-85233-175-5.
Vesely W & Fragola J 2002. Untitled article in the From Our Readers section.
Journal of System Safety, Vol. 38 No. 1, First Quarter 2002, pp 5 – 6.
Ward I 1998. An Introduction to Critical Legal Theory. Cavendish Publishing
Limited, ISBN 1-85941-348-X.
Wheeler SC 2000. Deconstruction As Analytic Philosophy. Stanford University
Press Cultural Memory in the Present Series, ISBN 0-8047-3753-3.
